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This thesis is a study of the Oslo District Court 2015 ruling of gross negligence on the part of 
the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) towards its staff consultant Patrick Dennis. Mr. Dennis 
was on an assignment in Kenya in 2012, when his convoy was attacked. He was shot in the 
leg, kidnapped and held for a period of time before rescue. He later sued NRC for damages 
sustained, and won in court. 
The court case was a first for the industry, a landmark case of a humanitarian organization 
found guilty of a serious breach of duty of care. It has prompted humanitarian organizations 
to paying increasingly careful attention to their practices of managing security in their 
challenging high-risk operational environments.  
This thesis is a case study of the failures by the NRC to properly establish reasonable security 
risk management practices. Commissioned by the Finnish NGO Crisis Management Initiative, it 
also attempted to draw lessons learned for the industry in managing their security in a more 
effective manner. The study is a theory-based content analysis that compares the theoretical 
and knowledge framework of the ISO31000:2009 risk management model to the official Oslo 
District Court ruling of 2015. The Oslo District Court ruling does not refer to risk management 
directly. In analysing the ruling, the study used the methodologies of theory-based content 
analysis in finding implicit parallels and meanings in the ruling that can be compared with the 
different steps of the risk management model. It attempted to find meanings in the text of 
the ruling that referred to failures in establishing the risk management context, in risk 
identification, in risk assessment and in risk treatment.  
They key finding was that the Oslo District Court ruling can be interpreted to have implicitly 
referred to failures for NRC during all steps of the risk management model used as the 
theoretical base. Failures were many and are listed in detail in the findings. Furthermore, for 
the security management model proposed in this thesis to be effective, the NRC ruling 
showed that absolute care must be placed to conduct the risk management process properly 
from the beginning. NRC’s failures were, to a large extent, failures made when the risk 
management process was begun. 
Furthermore, all the findings are summarized in a table that is used by the commissioning 
organization and other interested parties as a reference on how, if applying the 
ISO31000:2009 model, similar incidents can be avoided in the risk management practices in 
the future. 
Keywords: risk management, ISO31000:2009, duty of care, humanitarian aid, gross negligence 
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 1 Introduction 
Humanitarian aid organizations can be seen as a fringe element in the bigger picture of 
businesses and organizations that operate globally and across borders. They rarely work for-
profit, and often have full-time staff working in high-risk environments. They can receive 
spectacular media attention during times of humanitarian crises, but number only a fragment 
of total organizations with regular cross-border operations. A specialist field, the demands of 
their high-risk operational environments place exceptional requirements for their security and 
safety risk management structures. While for the larger for-profit enterprises and government 
organizations, a structured security management requirements and rigorous audits can often 
be a regular experience, aid organizations often rely on the vague concept of acceptance for 
ensuring the security and safety of their staff members (Humanitarian Practice Network, 
2010). Who would attack our organization if we are neutral and only there to protect 
innocent civilians suffering from the crisis?  
Humanitarian organizations, however, face numerous major attacks to their staff members 
each year. Furthermore, the total number of incidents is vastly increased if safety related 
incidents are included in the statistics. (Humanitarian Outcomes, 2017, 1). The nature of the 
humanitarian work is to operate where their help is needed the most. While this remains, in 
my opinion, truer than ever, and the number of humanitarian crises remains high, the 
operational realities must be balanced with the fact the many armed actors and conflict 
parties often see international, especially Western-led, non-governmental aid organizations 
(INGOs) as non-neutral extensions of the diplomacy practiced by their donor governments 
(Humanitarian Policy Group, 2012, 10). This can make the aid organization a tempting target 
for political violence. The risk of operating in these vulnerable environments is further 
amplified by looking at common robberies, abuse, safety incidents, medical risk in unsanitary 
conditions and psychological pressure. It can be said that aid workers put their life and health 
on the line every time they get off the plane and go to work. In my opinion, aid workers also 
tend to be idealistic people who accept a high amount of personal risk for the greater good of 
the results of their work. This is evident in the research where aid workers in the field were 
surveyed on whether their organization has become more or less risk-tolerant in recent years. 
79% of the people who answered did so with a yes (Humanitarian Outcomes, 2016, 10). The 
high risk-appetite and the reliance on acceptance, based on my observations, also reflect the 
relatively relaxed attitudes that aid organizations take in terms of security and safety risk 
management. 
Funding for humanitarian initiatives has been growing more slowly during recent years. Some 
major donors, such as the Gulf states, have cut their funding significantly (Development 
Initiatives, 2017, 44). This has become apparent with the populist and protectionist 
movements in the West and elsewhere. The lack in funding can result, according to my 
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personal observations, in increased pressure to deliver aid and still make meaningful impact 
while cutting from the administrative and support function costs. Security management can 
often be the first head on the block for organizations desperate to keep their core activities 
alive in an environment of dwindling funding.  
With the security function scaled down, aid organizations are left with tremendous 
vulnerabilities. The loss of assets in the case of incidents can be difficult to recover from. The 
loss of human life can be a trauma to the organization that it will never fully recover from.  
The loss of operational capacity due to an incident can lead to increased tragedy and 
suffering among the local populations that the organization is trying to help. The loss of 
reputation and liquidity in an event of a major litigation for staff security negligence can be 
detrimental and act as a long-term hindrance. 
European and Western aid organizations can, in my opinion, sometimes have a problematic 
relation to occupational health, safety and security legislation (sometimes referred to as legal 
duty of care) of their home countries. This stems from the unique nature of their working 
environment vis à vis the broad nature of the legislation. Usually, the related safety laws are 
intended for a wide spectrum of organizations, clear majority of which represent the local 
service and production industries. The interpretation of “reasonable and justifiable” security 
measures to be taken by an organization to protect its staff while in the workplace is 
relatively easy to transfer to regular businesses and organizations. For example, the laws for 
office safety and security tackle tangible questions related to ergonomics and common safety 
hazards around the office space. The matter is more complicated for the aid industry. How do 
the courts define safety and security in the workplace, when the workplace is, for example, a 
refugee camp in Mosul instead of the local supermarket in Helsinki? Do the courts make a 
distinction between these two, or do they mean that workplace is simply the location where 
your staff works? In case of a complex high-risk location, how does the employer determine if 
the security risk management and risk treatment measures taken were reasonable and 
justifiable – instead of negligent? What is the minimum of security risk management needed 
for these locations to fulfil the broad requirements set by the laws, and how is that minimum 
threshold interpreted in the case of an incident tried in court? These are just a few questions 
which can trouble managers in humanitarian and other organizations that operate in high risk 
environments, but are registered in countries such as Finland where legislation is strict on the 
legal duty of care of an employer. 
Aid organizations had, in the past, not experienced serious litigation due to negligence in 
matters of staff safety and security. Most of the incidents had been quietly settled out of 
courts between the families and the organizations. The question of common occupational 
health and safety legislation, and its relation to aid organizations that routinely operate in 
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high-risk contexts had not been an exercise that had been tested in court and no precedent 
existed (Oslo District Court, 2015, 13). 
This changed in November 2015. Three years earlier, in 2012, a Canadian contractor Steven 
Patrick Dennis was on a mission in Kenya for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). NRC is an 
organization that supports refugees and displaced people. During a VIP visit to IFO II refugee 
camp in Dabaab where the executive director of the organization was present, he and his 
colleagues were attacked and kidnapped. Their driver was shot dead during the kidnap 
operation, and Dennis sustained an injury to his knee. Dennis and his remaining colleagues 
were released four days later in a military operation orchestrated by the local police and a 
detachment from the local armed militia. In February 2015, Dennis sued NRC for his economic 
and non-economic losses after the incident. Later that year, the Norwegian courts ruled that 
NRC had acted with gross negligence in relation to staff safety and security (Oslo District 
Court, 2015, 11). The organization had to pay substantial compensation to Dennis. The 
reputation risk also amounted to loss of trust with partners and donors for the NRC to operate 
safely and manage the security of their staff. The duty of care of NRC was found to have been 
vastly lacking. 
More importantly, Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council case and its ruling set the precedent 
for a new era in which aid organizations, and indeed any organizations working in high-risk 
areas, are as liable as any other company or organization to fulfill their duty of care towards 
their staff members – consultant or otherwise. The idea that humanitarian exceptionalism 
might protect them from litigation was gone. The idea that legal duty of care of the country 
where the organization is based in did not extend to contractors or foreign operations had 
been erased. Many parties called the case “a game changer” and “a wake-up call” for the 
humanitarian aid industry with regards to their policies for staff safety and security (IRIN, 
2015). NRC practiced security management, had policies in place and had dedicated security 
advisers who worked on staff security on a daily basis – yet their approach was ruled 
inadequate by the Norwegian courts.  
This thesis is a detailed case study on the Dennis v. Norwegian Refugee Council 2015 case 
from the perspective of a ISO31000:2009 based risk management model used by the 
commissioning organization of the thesis. It attempts to tackle the court’s ruling from the 
perspective of risk management, draw conclusions as to how NRC failed in their risk 
management during every step of the process – and finally draw lessons learned for the 
commissioning organization and the industry as a whole. 
Even though the case is relatively recent, it has been subject to numerous news articles and 
analyses. At least one substantial study has been published on the incident and its 
implications for security risk management. A major publication called “Duty of Care: A review 
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of the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications” was published by the 
European Inter-Agency Security Forum (EISF, 2016). It studied the court case from the 
perspective of drawing practical lessons learned from the incident, and how all organizations, 
regardless of their risk management structures, can implement measures that benefit security 
management and promote duty of care. The previous study focuses on “the interrelation 
between the ruling, Duty of Care and security risk management (EISF, 2016, 8).” This study 
takes a different approach, and approaches the subject from a clear ISO31000:2009 risk 
management perspective. In this study, the duty of care is seen as a by-product of an 
effective and formal risk management process. Duty of care is not approached solely as a 
legal term from the perspective of analysing the court’s rationale for passing judgement on 
organization’s negligence. The previous study placed more emphasis on the court’s decision 
for a minimum legal duty of care requirements from the perspective of security management. 
In this study, the court case and its ruling will be analysed rigorously from the perspective of 
a pre-defined theoretical framework of risk management. The findings of this study will 
complement previous research on the topic by providing a more thorough risk management -
specific perspective to the case. Industry professionals can benefit from the combined 
analysis of this study and the previous study complied on the topic, as both the findings of 
will contribute to a more thorough and complete understanding of how major incidents like 
this can be avoided. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) has, since February 2018, launched a revised and updated version of 
their risk management standard. Called ISO31000:2018, it is an updated iteration on 
ISO31000:2009 and places more considerable emphasis on decision-making structures and 
continuous improvement models of risk management (ISO, 2018). This research was 
undertaken when ISO31000:2009 was still the dominant framework. Regardless of the new 
model, this research remains relevant as the basic risk management process used as the 
theory-base in this study remains unchanged from ISO31000:2009 to ISO31000:2018 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2018). This study will refer to the 
ISO31000:2009. 
2 Research question 
This thesis is a detailed case study on the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council case of 2015 
from the perspective of security and safety risk management as conducted using the 
ISO31000:2009 risk management model. It aims to analyze the content of the court ruling, 
and categorize its findings to provide lessons learned for security and safety risk management 
of aid organizations. 
This thesis analyzes details of the Oslo District Court ruling of gross negligence, and applies 
the findings into the definition and theory-base of security and safety risk management. It is 
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indeed easy to argue that the humanitarian industry is not the same after the ruling. All 
organizations realized that their duty of care and security risk management practices must be 
up to par with the challenging conditions faced in the vulnerable operational environments. 
The exceptional nature of their work and their working environment does not relieve them of 
their legal duty of care towards their staff members – on the contrary, it places special 
demands on the management of these operations.  
Based on this, the following research questions will be addressed in the thesis: 
• In the findings of the court ruling, and analyzed based on the definitions of 
ISO31000:2009 process of risk management, how was the security risk 
management of NRC lacking at the time of the incident? 
• How can the findings assist organizations in developing better practices for 
security risk management in high-risk contexts? 
The research will be explored through a case study of the court ruling. The case is of 
immense interest to anyone working in not only international development and aid, but also 
in for-profit enterprises that operate in high-risk environments. The main lesson learned from 
the incident is that the Norwegian interpretation of the legal duty of care extends equally to 
all organizations and enterprises regardless of their area of business. If they operate in high-
risk areas, security management and mitigation must be scaled upwards considerably to 
reflect that reality (Oslo District Court, 2015, 14).  
While the case was tried in a Norwegian court according to Norwegian common law, the 
principles and lessons learned are highly transferable. Most European, EU and ETA countries 
share similarities in occupational health and safety law and the codified duty of care 
requirements, and where no precedent for previous court cases exists in one’s home 
jurisdiction, courts can look at other countries with similar legislation for reference. It is, 
however, important to note that the European and Western understanding and application of 
occupational health, safety and security legislation is not universal. Many legislations do not 
register similar rights for workers and staff members to seek justice for negligence. Thus, the 
findings of this thesis are limited to a context where the organization is registered in a 
Norwegian (Western) legal system and the staff members have a right to file a claim in the 
Norwegian or similar courts. When an organization in a different jurisdiction judges their 
exposure to litigation, the different environment of legal risks should always be considered. 
The material used for research will be, in addition to the original public court rulings and 
documents, the significant commentaries, news items, third party analyses and publications. 
General concepts and theories of security and safety risk management are explored through 
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leading articles and books in the field. Statistics are referred from the leading organizations 
specializing in collecting data on INGO operations, safety and security. 
This thesis focuses initially on defining the core concepts around humanitarian work, the 
humanitarian context and humanitarian security risk management. A clear risk management 
perspective is taken, and it is assumed that the standards of duty of care (legal or otherwise) 
derive directly as an output of security risk management. Security risk management is 
introduced by providing a concise overview of the definitions of safety and security from the 
perspective of management and managerial processes. These core definitions are expanded 
to provide an understanding of the theoretical and practice-based framework of 
ISO31000:2009. This framework and its terminology is later examined thoroughly against the 
findings of the Oslo District Court ruling of gross negligence. The thesis will conclude by 
providing a sheet of lessons learned and best practices that can be used by all organizations 
operating in high-risk environments. These lessons learned will be tied to the ISO31000:2009 
risk management process. 
To highlight, this thesis does not aim to tie the lessons learned to the specific context of the 
court case tried over the incident in Kenya. Instead, it looks at how high-risk environments in 
general should be approached in terms of security risk management. The focus is on 
transferable lessons learned. This applies not only to different mission destinations, but also 
to different organizations, regardless of whether they are for- or non-profit, who have 
business in high-risk areas. While the case will be studied from the perspective of 
humanitarian organizations, the approach angle to security risk management in high-risk 
operational environments will remain transferable.  
The approach of this thesis is to look at the standards of security risk management according 
to the precedent set by the court case and the findings of the court. Duty of care is explored 
and understood as an output of effective security risk management. It is important, however, 
to underline that the employer’s duty of care is not limited to the legal minimum standards. 
A strong system of staff safety and security should, in my opinion, be a combination of legal 
pressure and ethical sense of responsibility to do business reliably and staff well-being firmly 
in mind. 
The decision to use ISO31000:2009 model was made due to my organization Crisis 
Management Imitative using it as the model for security and safety risk management. While I 
acknowledge the existence of other models for risk management, the practical purpose of 
this thesis limits the scope to the one used by the contracting organization. 
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2.1 Significance of the research question and the industry application 
The idea for this research came from my professional background and current occupation in 
humanitarian security and safety risk management. 
Our industry has a dire need for a comprehensive analysis of the rationale and the lessons 
learned from the NRC case. Safety and security risk management is, based on my 
observations, often overlooked in many humanitarian INGOs. The focus tends to be on the 
bare minimum of security management, while overlooking the substantial risk of litigation 
that might follow an incident.  
A lost case in court will often result in enormous financial loss and loss of reputation. 
Reputation is especially difficult, because earning it back might take a long time or not 
happen at all. Recovery is made more difficult by the possible loss of funding and partner 
relations. Aid organizations rely on trust as their main lifeline. Trust between donors, 
partners and their staff members remains crucial – while the trust between the organization 
and their aid recipients remains paramount. If these are challenged, operations can rarely 
continue as needed. To improve and manage security risk, a detailed look, such as this thesis, 
is needed to understand how negligence happens and how security management can be scaled 
up to meet the requirements set by the authorities. This is also a useful starter for a 
discussion on the basic requirements of security and safety risk management, and how to 
balance them with the reality of not wanting to jeopardize aid recipient trust and 
acceptance. 
I personally and firmly believe that all value creation for an organization starts from first 
taking care of their staff members and providing them with a safe and secure working 
environment. 
This thesis will be produced to enhance the security and safety risk management standards of 
the Finnish peacebuilding and conflict resolution NGO Crisis Management Initiative, where the 
author works as a Security Advisor. The findings will be summarized in a lessons-learned table 
that will be used as a reference tool for the organization’s leadership and other interested 
parties when making decision on the best practices of security and safety risk management in 
high-risk operational environments.  
This thesis will tackle the complex topic of the court ruling with the aim to provide industry-
wide best-practices for the risk management structures and practices for all organizations 
operating in challenging conditions. It will complement the previous study on the topic by 
focusing on risk management in general instead of the technicalities of security management 
in particular. With this study conducted, and previous studies considered, organizations will 
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be able to benefit from a broad knowledge base for improving their own practices. This is 
assumed to profoundly benefit the industry. 
3 Context and the concepts around humanitarian aid 
3.1 Development, humanitarianism, aid work and non-governmental organizations 
Humanitarian aid organization, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), promote 
development and undertake development projects globally and in different sectors of society. 
InterAction defines international development as “the well-being of the world’s poorest and 
most vulnerable people without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs.” (InterAction, 2017). This definition notes NGOs as working to support vulnerable 
populations suffering from either man-made or natural disasters. The modern approach to 
development is to approach social problem solving from the perspective of sustainability. This 
is also highlighted in the definition provided by InterAction. 
Governments also engage directly in international development, but often the main actor is 
an NGO that is being funded by a government body. NGO is defined by the Oxford dictionary 
“an organization that operates independently of any government, typically one whose 
purpose is to address a social or political issue.” (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). Collectively, NGOs 
are often referred to as the “third sector” or the “civil society”.  
Social and political issues that NGOs tackle can range from the delivery food rations and 
medical assistance to supporting third world governments in building sustainable models of 
governance. Humanitarian principles are closely linked with the goals and definitions of 
international development. Oxford dictionary defines humanitarianism as “concerned with or 
seeking to promote human welfare” (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). Thus, humanitarian aid often 
refers to delivering material aid to vulnerable people in an attempt to promote their welfare. 
It is important to note that humanitarian aid is often not strictly material, but can also be 
consultancy to a local authority in how to build models of welfare locally. Indeed, modern 
perspectives of development are often based on the idea of building capacities in target 
destinations for sustained development and the ability to remove the reliance on external aid 
(European Parliament, 2017). 
Well-known Finnish NGOs include, for example, Finn Church Aid (Kirkon Ulkomaanapu) who 
bring food, rations and other aid to vulnerable destinations and Crisis Management Initiative 
who specialize in supporting peace through informal dialogue and mediation.  
International development is a vast field with many different players involved. All 
organizations have their own models of implementation and logistics. These also differ based 
on donor requirements and the requirements of their aid recipients. This affects their 
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standing in the country and the level of security and safety considerations that they need to 
take. 
4 Security and safety risk management 
To understand risk management, and how to analyse the NRC case from the perspective of 
security and safety risk management, it is important to begin by defining the core concepts of 
security, safety and security management. These basic definitions will feed into a broad 
understanding of how security risk management acts as a part of a broader risk management 
framework. Furthermore, understanding the basic concepts will allow the reader to gain a 
more informed understanding of the lessons learned based on the case study to follow. 
Security professionals often look at safety and security through the lens of security risk 
management. This chapter will unpack the different definitions and provide an outline for 
security risk management that will be referred to when analysing the case study and its 
implications for organizations. Different organizations, humanitarian or otherwise, will have 
developed their own unique ways of approaching security and safety risk management. It is, 
however, important to note that the underlying principles, definitions and processes remain 
very similar. The idea of “managing security” has a relatively standardized direction of 
approach, and this also extends to the attempt to standardize the different definitions around 
the core concepts within the discipline. 
We will begin by defining risk, security and safety. The three most fundamental terms that 
we will be dealing with throughout the thesis. After these definitions, we will put them into 
the context of security and safety risk management. How does a security management system 
look like – especially in terms of humanitarian operations? This system will then be put into 
the context of security risk management. We will look at how security and safety risk 
management will support organizations in maintaining the required level of duty of care from 
the perspective of effective risk management based on the theoretical framework of 
ISO31000:2009 risk management. 
4.1 Risk, security and safety 
To study risk, security and safety, it is worthwhile to begin with the definition of Risk. This 
definition can be used as a starting point to broaden the understanding in terms of how risk 
thinking is applied to manage issues related to security and safety.  
Risk has an intuitive meaning of something that can bring us harm or damage us. It is 
worthwhile to begin by exploring the colloquial definition of risk. Indeed, the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines risk as “a situation involving exposure to danger” (Oxford Dictionary, 
2017). On many occasions, risk is used to imply a negative effect brought about by an adverse 
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situation. This definition is a good starting point, but does not satisfy the needs of a security 
risk manager. 
Risk can be understood as being broader than what the colloquial definition suggests. Risks 
can also result in positive outcomes. The case of gambling is a classic example. Betting on 
cards exposes the gambler to the risk of losing their money, but, with little luck and skill, the 
gambler might find the cards to be on his side and win more than he initially put at stake. It 
is clear then that risk should not only signify a negative outcome. Risk researcher Paul Hopkin 
dissects the definition by giving it three dimensions: that of a negative outcome, a positive 
outcome and the risk related to the uncertainty of the outcome (Hopkin, 2010, 11).  
This thesis will approach the definition of risk from the International Organization of 
Standardization’s (ISO) perspective, as it is a common framework for managing risk. They 
have defined risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objects” (ISO Guide 73:2009, 2009, 1.1). 
This definition maintains the idea of risk as a positive, negative or uncertain event. According 
to Hopkin, most organizations are already relying on this definition, or a definition that 
closely resembles the one of ISO (Hopkin, 2010, 12). Institute of Risk Management, for 
example, defines risk as the “combination of the probability of an event and its consequence, 
including positive and/or negative consequence” (Hopkin, 2010, 12). 
For the topic of this thesis, the most important part of defining risk is in understanding its 
relation to the strategic decision making of an organization. In terms of humanitarian 
operations, and indeed all non- or for-profit ventures, the balancing of either taking the risk 
or not is a crucial part of strategic decision-making. For humanitarian organizations, the risk 
of going in to, for example, Yemen to support the famine-gripped population might be high in 
terms of their security and safety, but the positive impact of helping the population and 
attracting positive donor and media attention might be high enough to allow for the 
leadership of the organization to decide on implementing the dangerous project. If the risk is 
accepted, it becomes the responsibility of the organization to manage the negative impact of 
the uncertainty in a way that adheres to, for the very least, the legal requirements of the 
organization’s home country and translates into tangible solutions of organizational and staff 
safety and security. 
The fundamental failure of NRC to manage the security related aspects of this uncertainty 
can be seen as being at the core of their incident and the legal proceedings that followed. 
Furthermore, the same can be said for all organizations facing critical incidents regardless of 
their area of operations. This is not only limited to environments of high risk (or high 
uncertainty), but indeed all environments where risk is present. Risk scientist Albert R. Wilson 
has observed that there is no scientific way of absolutely determining that risk does not exist 
(Wilson, 1991, 98). This means that risk management (discussed in the later chapter) can only 
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be disregarded at the organization’s own peril. An environment is often described as high risk 
when the number of incidents recorded is found to be high compared to the observed normal. 
If the risks in an environment are related to war, civil unrest, terrorism or extreme crime, the 
area is often called a hostile environment (BBC myRisks, 2016). A definition of a hostile 
environment has a clear focus on personal safety and security, but risks are also present when 
discussing, for example, organization’s finances, reputation and strategy (Hopkin, 2010, 150). 
This thesis will mainly focus on security and safety risk. 
Security and safety are often the key definitions when looking at risk exposure in 
humanitarian and other operations of high uncertainty. Like risk, they have an intuitive 
meaning for everyone, as well as standardized and operationalized definitions for security and 
safety risk professionals. When thinking about security and safety, it is intuitively clear that a 
security or a safety incident does not have a positive outcome. Security and safety incidents 
are hazard risks that only result in negative outcomes (Hopkin, 2010, 13). That’s why, if an 
environment is perceived as high risk for safety and security, many organizations are 
prompted into action. 
Both security and safety address the wellbeing of personnel and other assets. Security is often 
seen as an umbrella term that also includes safety. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines 
security as “the quality or state of being secure, freedom from danger” and safety as “the 
condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury or loss” (Merriam-Webster, 
2017). These definitions do not yet help a researcher much in finding a clear definition 
between the two. When studying aviation security and safety, researchers Kenneth Pettersen 
and Torkel Bjornskau made a distinction that safety deals with internal hazards while security 
is focused on external threats and attacks (Pettersen, Bjornskau, 2015, 169). From this, it is 
possible to derive that safety deals with accidents, incidents and hazardous events without an 
external attacker. Security, on the other hand, is seen as an incident where an external party 
commits an attack on the organization or its assets. The difference can be illustrated by 
taking for example a scenario where a staff member of an organization drives a car during a 
mission. Difficult road conditions read to the vehicle being crashed against a tree and the 
driver is injured. This is a safety incident as it was result of involuntary and accidental loss of 
control of the vehicle on the part of a driver. In another scenario the staff member is being 
driven by a local driver. For personal reasons, the driver decides to crash the car into a tree 
to harm the other person in the car. This is a security incident as it is a voluntary attack 
against the person being transported. Sometimes these incidents overlap, and a safety 
incident can lead to security incidents and vice-versa. For example, if the car in the first 
scenario crashes in the middle of the countryside in South Sudan, it leaves the driver exposed 
to third parties who might be inclined to, for example, rob or kidnap her. This thesis will use 
this distinction when discussing safety and security.  
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Security and safety risk can be derived by the combined definition of the previously 
discussed definitions. As previously noted, Institute of risk management defined risk as the 
outcome of an event when it is considered from the perspective of its consequences and 
likelihood (Hopkin, 2010, 12). Thus, to look at safety risk, an organization must take a 
specific security incident, such as a car crash, and evaluate its likelihood and its 
consequences. If both are high, it is a high safety risk event.  
Security and safety risk is discussed in companies and organizations within the concept of 
corporate or organizational security. This definition relates to the question of “whose 
security?” or “whose safety?”. In security analysis, the object that is being secured is called 
the referent object (Buzan, Waever, De Wilde; 1998, 35). The object is something that is 
existentially threatened and has a legitimate claim for survival (Buzan, Waever, De Wilde; 
1998, 36). In the context of corporate or organizational security, the referent object is the 
organization itself. This means that the security measures taken are to ensure the continuity 
of the organization and its operations. In practice, this means that organizations must adopt 
ways to manage security and safety risk. Staff can often be seen as the key asset of an 
organization; thus, the protection of staff can be understood as a crucial element of 
supporting the contingency of the business. 
4.2 Security and safety risk management 
According to management scientist Fredmund Malik, management is defined as the 
transformation of resources into utility or value (Malik, 2017). Security and safety risk 
management is usually an organization’s internal support function. It turns organizations 
resources (for example security allocated budget, knowledge and human resources) into 
tangible tools (utility and value) to control the effects of security and safety related 
uncertainty. These tools vary from individual risk to risk and might include, for example, 
training, secure transportation, arms or personal security details and medical assistance. 
Security and safety risk management falls into the bigger picture of risk management, where 
modern enterprises and organizations use varied tools of risk management to deal and to 
react to uncertainty caused by many different factors (Hopkin, 2010, i). Indeed, security risk 
management should be seen as a small part of the bigger picture of managing all risks related 
to organizational strategy, value creation and contingency. Other areas of risk management 
include, for example financial and operational risk management (Hopkin, 2010, 150). For the 
purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on management of security and safety risk. 
European Inter-Agency Security Form is an independent organization that supports 
humanitarian organizations in security and safety risk management. They define security risk 
management as a “framework of policies, protocols, plans, mechanisms and responsibilities 
that support the reduction of security risks to staff”. (EISF, 2017, 6). This is a useful 
 17 
 
definition, as it highlights that security management is a multi-dimensional whole that spans 
from the organizational policymaking all the way to field implementation, planning and 
operational protocol. Ideally, security management is present in every stage of organizational 
activity. With the supervision of the organizational leadership, it aims to tackle and minimize 
risks involved on every step of the organization’s value creation process. 
5 ISO 31000:2009 as a security and safety risk management process  
5.1 The process of ISO3100:2009 
Economist David A. Garvin defines organizational processes as “collections of tasks and 
activities that together — and only together — transform inputs into outputs.” (Garvin, 1998, 
1). Security and safety risk management is a collection of many tasks and activities that work 
together to support the desired end goal of controlling the effects of security and safety 
related uncertainty. These activities include for example, threat assessments, risk 
assessments, risk analyses, risk treatment, auditing, training and more. Different 
organizations have different approaches to establishing their systems of security risk 
management. Organization might start to manage security risk by, for example, by naming a 
security manager, conducting a threat assessment, implementing a security risk management 
programme and working with other departments in implementing security and safety controls. 
The process of security risk management will vary according to, for example, the size, 
strategy, resources and values of the organization. For example, an IT company will most 
likely have a different security department from a humanitarian NGO. 
For the purposes of this thesis, we will be looking at the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) defined models for risk management. Their standardized models are 
widely used, and are often used in the context of not only security and safety risk 
management, but also risk management in the widest sense of the definition. Many 
organizations prefer to internally use standardized models of risk management to be able to 
compare the results effectively. There are also many incentives to promote standardized 
practices across whole industries. This will promote, among other things, better information-
sharing, industry development and public oversight. ISO models for risk management have 
been created to promote this harmonization. The ISO standardized process of risk 
management is at the core of what the security and safety department of an organization 
usually does. By understanding the process, it is possible to understand how security and 
safety risk is handled from the risk management point of view. 
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Figure 1, ISO31000:2009 (University of Queensland, 2018) 
The chart above is referenced from University of Queensland’s staff guide that is intended to 
demonstrate to their staff how the risk management process works for their organization. It is 
a standard model for risk management that is used almost universally by all organizations that 
conduct risk management according to the ISO standards. 
It is important to note that the ISO standardized risk management process is intended to be 
cyclical. It is a model of constant design, implementation, monitoring and reviewing of the 
risk management results (ISO, 2019). This cycle is sometimes referred to as the PDCA or plan-
do-check-act -cycle. This is especially important in high-risk environments where the context 
is changing rapidly. 
This overview will go through all the steps of the risk management process. They will be used 
as the basis for the research on the case study of the NRC court case. 
5.2 Establishing the risk management context 
ISO 31000 risk management process starts with establishing the context for risk management. 
This means that the risk management team will decide on which part of the organizational 
activity the risk management will target. For a humanitarian organization, the context might 
be, for example, a rations warehouse in Juba, South Sudan. The team will research the 
context, decide on the scope of the assessment, consider what internal and external actors 
are present within the given context and the process, establish communication lines and 
harmonize assumptions and terminology (International Organization for Standardization, 
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2009). The establishment of the context can be seen as “setting of the rules” for the process. 
Determining, for example, the knowledge base used in the process relates to the question of 
which human resources to utilize (internally or externally) in the risk management steps that 
follow. 
The Department of Finance of the Australian government uses ISO 3100:2009 principles in 
supporting the development of risk management practices across the spectrum of their public 
organizations. These practices are also shared across the Commonwealth governments 
(Government of Australia, 1). They rely on the methodology of establishing the context from 
the perspective of the external context, the internal context and the risk management 
context. This example is used, because it relies of a long tradition of the government (and 
the Commonwealth governments in general) having implemented ISO 31000:2009. Their 
approach is also, according to my opinion, very close to the ideal standards set by ISO. 
• The external context includes, for example, the following factors: political, cultural, 
environmental, legal, regulatory, environmental and key trends in the industry 
(Government of Australia, 2). The failure to research these properly, or identify key 
personnel that have intimate knowledge in these areas, can result in lacking results in 
the next steps of the risk management process. 
• The internal context relates to the organizational goals, strategy, capabilities of the 
organization and the organizational culture (Government of Australia, 2). It is crucial 
to identify the perceived added value and the resources that will be allocated to the 
process. As risks might also be internal in nature, these factors must be included and 
noted when risks are managed. 
• The risk management context means that all relevant staff members within the 
organization are identified and included in the process of risk management. Inclusion 
might include, for example, deciding on who makes decision based on the results of 
the assessment and how the process itself is managed and implemented into practice 
(Government of Australia, 2). 
The failure of an organization to establish a sustainable context in terms on analysis and 
resources will lead to lacking results and during the rest of the risk management process. 
5.3 Risk assessment 
Risk assessment will include the identification, analysis and evaluation of risks in the 
previously established context.  
Identification means that the risk management team will attempt, using a selection of 
identification tools and resources, compile an as comprehensive a list of risks as possible 
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related to the context. For the case of Juba warehouse, the risks can range from fire, flood 
and structural collapse to robbery, terrorism and more. Identification phase can be conducted 
using, for example, brainstorming, statistical analysis, workshops, interviews, benchmarking 
and many other tools. In the identification phase, risks are recorded, and their outcomes are 
described as thoroughly as possible (International Organization for Standardization, 2009). It 
is important to note that the findings of risk identification rely heavily on the resources (HR 
or otherwise) allocated to the process during the establishment of the risk management 
process. If the key individuals with most knowledge on the context are not included, the list 
of identified risks will remain lacking.  
Risk analysis means that the risks are assigned a numerical value based on their likelihood 
and consequence. This ties the process together with the theory of risk discussed in the 
previous chapter. Often in security and safety risk management, risk events only have a 
negative consequence, but it is important to note that many risks are also evaluated by rating 
their consequence from negative to neutral and positive (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009). The likelihood can be determined, for example, based on statistics, 
expert opinion or other sources. Negative impact (which is often the case with security and 
safety related hazards) can be determined by, for example, the amount of monetary or 
productivity loss caused by the event. 
Risk evaluation is the final step in the risk assessment. It is used to evaluate, according to 
the previous findings, as to in which order the previously identified and analysed risks are to 
be treated. Organizations usually have set up their risk thresholds (how much risk they are 
willing to accept), and if the findings of the risk assessment show that the context presents 
individual risks that are above their risk threshold, they will have to be treated. If they 
cannot be affected (due to the nature of the risk or the lack of organization’s resources), it is 
the decision of the organization’s leadership as whether to decide to move ahead with the 
activity or pull back (International Organization for Standardization, 2009). As risk is the 
result of RISK = LIKELIHOOD X IMPACT, it is easy to evaluate risks hierarchically if the risk 
analysis process has been done carefully. The list of highest risks should exist, and the 
evaluation process can act as a review of the findings.  
5.4 Risk treatment 
Risk treatment is the collective term for actions taken to address the results of the risk 
assessment. They range from pulling back from the activity altogether to implementing risk 
specific security policies and practices to counter the uncertainty that is identified in the 
operational environment. Generally, the likelihood or an impact of an individual risk can be 
adjusted by implementing strict controls. For example, the perimeter and guarding of the 
Juba warehouse can be increased. This can reduce the risk of, for example, robbery and 
terrorism. Humanitarian organizations often rely on acceptance, as the ethical considerations 
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of increasing, for example, armed protection can adversely influence their reputation in the 
eyes of the local aid recipients or the local government. 
5.5 Communications, review and risk management support 
As previously discussed, the ISO risk management model relies on the cycling model. This is 
evident in the communication & consultation and monitoring & review steps that happens 
throughout the formal process and after it. The implementation and efficiency of the risk 
treatment measures is evaluated constantly, and when the environment changes the formal 
process of risk assessment is initiated again. Communication happens during every step of the 
risk management process. This relates to internal as well as external communications. 
5.6 Relation between security management and security risk management 
It is important to note that security management and security risk management can be used, 
according to my purposes, interchangeably. I believe that anything that goes under the 
umbrella of security management is linked to the core activity of context analysis, risk 
assessment, risk treatment and review. All security management activities derive their goals 
and purpose from the risk management process. Strictly speaking, security management 
includes activities that are not part of the risk management process per se such as key asset 
identification, vulnerability assessment, organizational policy craft, internal communications, 
emergency preparedness and business continuity planning. These activities, however, rely 
heavily on the risk management processes, and are often risk treatment methods in 
themselves. The focus of this thesis will be on security risk management, and suggestions on 
how to derive better value from the process by recognizing the minimum outputs for risk 
treatment according to the legal duty of care requirements in the context of the case study. 
The validity and the care put into security and safety risk management is one of the most 
important aspects of conducting meaningful security management. If the process is hurried or 
biased, the results will not reflect the reality of the situation on the ground. This can lead to 
misinformed decision-making and critical incidents that have far reaching consequences. 
Single incidents can undermine the reputation and the contingency of an organization – even 
detrimentally so. The failure of the Norwegian Refugee Council, according to the court, to 
make realistic decisions based on their staff safety and security caused them to suffer the 
consequences of poor security risk management. 
6 Duty of care, negligence and compliance 
The case study and the findings of this thesis discuss the relationship between the employer’s 
legal duty of care and security risk management.  
Legal duty of care is the organization’s responsibility to act with “reasonable care” when 
dealing with others (Rottenstein Law, 2018). It relates to tort and contract law, and means 
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that if an organization has acted negligently towards a, for example, a staff member, it is 
liable for the harm caused to that staff member. Duty of care is not codified as such in all 
legislations, but it is related and highly interchangeable with, for example, the Finnish 
occupational health and safety legislation or työtyurvallisuuslaki. Many legislations retain the 
idea that it is the duty of the employer to make sure that all reasonable measures are taken 
to protect staff in the workplace. For example, if a manufacturing plant fails to install 
emergency stop buttons in their production lines, or if a staff member is not clearly trained 
on how to use the buttons, in the event of an incident, the employer will be legally and 
financially responsible of the damages to that staff member. 
Depending on the magnitude of the failure to uphold duty of care, an organization may be 
charged with negligence or gross negligence. Gross negligence implies a conscious and 
voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care, which is likely to cause foreseeable 
grave injury or harm to persons, property, or both (Farlex, 2018). In the case of non-gross 
negligence, the failure to exercise reasonable care can be involuntary or accidental. Gross 
negligence implies to either a conscious decision of breaching the duty of care, or a major 
failure to live up to the expectations of the safety standards in an involuntary way (i.e. a 
doctor forgetting a foreign instrument inside a patient’s body during surgery) (Farlex, 2018). 
Finnish legislation discusses the duty of care with a Finnish translation of työnantajan yleinen 
huolehtimisvelvollisuus (Työturvallisuuslaki, 2002, 8§) The law states that the organizations 
are required to take all necessary precautions to protect the health, safety and security of 
their employees in the workplace (Työturvallisuuslaki, 2002, 8§). Furthermore, it states that 
the employer must, according to the nature of the work, do a reasonably systematic 
assessment of dangers related to the work (Työturvallisuuslaki, 2002. 10§). Appropriate 
measures must be taken to reduce obvious risk of violence in the workplace, if an obvious risk 
of violence is present (Työturvallisuuslaki, 2002, 27§).  
While legislations differ, many legal systems retain these similar qualities and requirements 
for the employer. The reasonable and justifiable care is usually the main building block of a 
law related to occupational health and safety. The language is often quite similar. 
For humanitarian organizations, these laws present uncertainties. For example, most 
legislations discuss health, safety and security in the workplace. This is obviously geared 
towards a broad range of organizations and businesses where the definition of a workplace is 
self-evident (i.e. a grocery store or a manufacturing compound). Does the definition extend 
to foreign missions outside the country? If an aid organization, or indeed any organization, 
sends a staff member to a foreign destination for a week, will that place be considered the 
workplace? The answer is not immediately clear, and, until the NRC court case, had not been 
tested in court.  
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The other problem relates to the definitions of necessary, appropriate and justifiable 
measures taken to protect staff. In environments of high uncertainty, such as a war zone or a 
fragile state, how do the organizations determine and identify the requirements of necessary, 
appropriate and justifiable measures taken. How does the court determine these, and how do 
the organizations know if they have exposure to litigation? NRC ruling has shed light on this as 
well, and it will be discussed at length in the case study. Identifying these measures is indeed 
the domain of responsible security risk management. Proper risk management can thus be the 
critical component of ensuring compliance with the legislation. 
6.1 Scope of the analysis for duty of care 
This thesis is not an analysis of the intricacies of any specific legal system. It will not be a 
case study on the Norwegian law, and on how it was applied to the NRC case within its legal 
context. It is also not a reflection on how the Finnish law might interpret the case from the 
perspective of their legislation.  
Instead, the thesis will focus on the broad justifications made by the court on the definitions 
of necessary and appropriate duty of care. These definitions will be translated into the 
language of security risk management, and the theory-based model of ISO31000:2009 in 
particular. The language of employer’s legal duty of care overlaps enough across legislations 
to be interesting in terms of analysis. The failure to meet the necessary, appropriate and 
justifiable measures is often a failure of security risk management. The incident happened in 
a high-risk foreign operations context, and the chain of events leading to the incident 
provides valuable lessons learned for all organizations wanting to ensure legal duty of care 
and promote effective security risk management, regardless of the jurisdiction in which they 
are registered. 
Thus, this will not be a study on legal duty of care per se, but the gross negligence of the 
ruling is a direct impact of the failure to implement legal duty of care. In many Western 
organizations. the upper management often has a clear perspective of security risk 
management as a way to prevent exposure to legal action due to lacking mechanisms of duty 
of care. The idea of compliance with legal duty of care, according to the aims of this 
research, is implied to come as a direct result of effective security risk management. Thus, 
when the idea of duty of care is discussed, it can be understood as a direct output of 
security risk management. 
7 Research strategy and methodology 
The following research is qualitative and descriptive case study. It attempts to analyse the 
contents of the court ruling from the perspective of security risk management with the 
methodology of theory-based content analysis. Research strategy is the combination of 
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methodological tools used for the research, while the individual tools are the methods of 
research (Hirsjärvi, Remes ja Sajavaara, 2009, 132). 
Qualitative research is, by nature, holistic and exploratory acquisition of information 
(Hirsjärvi et.al, 2009, 164). The approach of this study is to look at the court case, and 
describe and interpret the case from the perspective of the ISO31000:2009 based security risk 
management framework of definitions. It attempts to find plausible explanations as to how, 
based on the court’s ruling, the risk management of the organization could have been 
conducted with more efficiency to prevent the incident from happening. Qualitative research 
is described as finding theoretically plausible explanations on an event or a phenomenon 
(Tuomi ja Sarajärvi 2009, 85). 
Case study can be argued to not be a research method in itself, but a collection of different 
approaches and data sources to a case that provides added value and interest to a researcher 
(Swanborn, 2010, 12).  Case study object, as is in this case, can be chosen because of the 
unique nature of the event and its interest as a “watershed” in the given context (Eskola & 
Suoranta 2005, 65.). In this research, the case is the NRC vs. Dennis court case tried in the 
Oslo District Court in 2012, and the object of research is the official document of Oslo District 
Court ruling. It’s status as the first major liability and negligence case tried against an aid 
organization sets it as a unique case to consider for lessons learned. 
The research is conducted as a theory-based content analysis. With a deductive approach, an 
earlier set of established theoretical definitions is applied to the case study object in an 
interpretive way to understand if lessons can be learned from the findings from the 
perspective of ISO31000:2009 based security risk management.  
Depending on the researcher’s goals, content analysis can be both a research strategy and a 
method. It allows for a structured inquiry into many different forms of communication 
(written, verbal etc.). As it has a target of inquiry, it is empirical in nature (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2009, 91). The empirical object of this inquiry is the official document of the Oslo District 
Court Ruling.  
Theory-based content analysis is a deductive approach of looking at the object of inquiry. It 
takes the framework of definitions as a “given”, and attempts to test that framework against 
the empirical findings of the content analysis. In other words, it attempts to find new 
meaning on the content studied, based on a defined framework of theory and definitions. 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 96-98). The theoretical framework of established definitions is the 
ISO 31000:2009 risk management process and its steps. It relies on the definitions and theory 
laid out in the previous chapters. 
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The ruling of the Oslo District Court will be analysed by considering related meanings within 
the written ruling and the definitions framework of ISO3100:2009 risk management process. 
The research will compare the ruling to ISO3100:2009 through a set of keywords that bridge 
the language of the ruling and the language of risk management. Keywords will be assigned 
into different categories based on the steps in the risk management process. The findings will 
be presented hierarchically. It is important to note that the study will not attempt to criticize 
the ruling, but instead takes it as a given. The category that receives most attention in the 
court ruling is presumed to have had the most weight in determining the court’s decision of 
gross negligence. These categories will be given most weight when analysis and lessons 
learned are presented in the final chapter. 
This methodology will attempt to answer the research questions presented earlier: “In the 
findings of the court ruling, and analyzed based on the definitions of ISO31000:2009 process 
of risk management, how was the security risk management of NRC lacking at the time of 
the incident?” and “How can the findings assist aid organizations in developing better 
practices for security risk management in high-risk contexts?” 
The complete research process and strategy is as follows: 
 
Phase 1: Choosing the case study object of 
interest: Oslo District Court Ruling of NRC 
gross negligence. 
The case study was chosen because of its 
nature as a unique and trend-setting event 
in the humanitarian industry. 
Phase 2: Defining the applicable research 
methodology and definitions framework for 
the case study: theory based content 
analysis 
Theory based content analysis will allow the 
researcher to find meaning in content that 
has not been explicitly stated in the object 
of research. It will allow the exploration of 
ISO 3100:2009 based security risk 
management (framework) meanings and 
similarities in the court ruling. 
Phase 3: Categorizing the content according 
to the theoretical and definition-based 
framework: each step of the risk 
management process is an individual 
category of interest 
The content is categorized according to 
every step of the ISO3100:2009. Every step 
of the process is its own category in the 
theory-based content analysis. Meanings in 
the document will be explored according to 
the following categories: 
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• Establishing the risk management 
context 
• Risk assessment 
• Risk treatment 
Phase 4: Identifying the keywords and 
synonyms for every category of inquiry and 
researching the NRC ruling. 
Each category will be assigned, based on the 
theoretical framework, a number of related 
keywords and synonyms that reflect similar 
meanings as the risk management step in 
question. For each category, The NRC ruling 
will be systematically scanned to identify 
how many times these keywords appear. 
Phase 5: Presenting findings Findings will be presented statistically by 
creating a hierarchy of the observed 
similarities. If, for example, the number of 
risk assessment related similarities is 
highest, it can be presumed that the biggest 
neglect by the NRC was conducted in that 
step. 
Phase 6: Analysis and lessons learned Lessons learned will be my reflections based 
on the findings of the research. They will 
suggest ways forward for industry 
professional attempting to develop their 
own practices for security risk management 
in high-risk contexts. The result will be a list 
of suggestions to ensure duty of care in 
high-risk contexts. 
 
7.1 Establishing the keywords for the research 
Keywords will be established based on the similar meanings of the words vis a vie the 
colloquial discourse (as in the NRC court ruling) and the professional risk management 
terminology. Colloquial discourse, in this case, means that security is discussed by people who 
are not security management professionals (the court) and/or do not attempt to describe the 
event with the terminology risk management. It is important to understand that the NRC 
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document does not address the level of security risk management in the organization, and is 
not a direct critique to the risk management methods used by the organization. From this 
perspective, the relation to security risk management is only implied and is derived from 
comparing colloquial discourse to the definitions within the process of ISO31000:2009. As an 
example, the court might say that the security measure of not using an armoured transport 
has contributed significantly to the event of the kidnapping having taken place. This does not 
mention risk management, but “security measures” mentioned relate directly to the risk 
treatment step of ISO31000:2009 risk management. The study will attempt to, through a 
comprehensive list of keywording, attempt to find these kinds of similarities between the 
court ruling and the process of ISO31000:2009. 
It is also important to note that the context within which the keyword is used is analysed to 
ensure its relevance to the research question. If “security measure(s)” is used as a keyword, 
it will only be noted if it is mentioned in a context that has contributed to the court’s ruling. 
If it is used by, for example, the court describing its own work process or is mentioned in the 
table of contents, it is omitted from the findings. If a selected keyword is relevant in only a 
proportionally small number of its total appearance in the text, its inclusion in the findings is 
justified with further description. 
At this point, it is useful to refer to the earlier graph of the ISO31000:2009 risk management 
process. The three categories for analysing the court ruling are: establishing the context, risk 
assessment and risk treatment. 
 
(University of Queensland, 2016) 
It must be noted that the underlying support functions of the ISO31000:2009 that are related 
to monitoring, review and communications are omitted from this study. This is a rational 
decision to tighten the focus and narrow the scope of the thesis. They might be referred to 
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during the findings, but only when relevant to the three main steps of establishing the 
context, risk assessment and risk treatment. Furthermore, the questions on establishing lines 
of communication, monitoring, decision-making and review are intentionally placed in the 
first category. 
All the categories with the selected keywords are listed below. Keywords are listed as 
individual words or phrases that reflect, in colloquial language, the professional definitions of 
the ISO31000:2009 risk management process. For example, the risk assessment includes, in 
the official terminology, the analysis of the likelihood and impact of the risk. In colloquial 
terms, these might be referred to as, for example, the possibility and the outcome of the 
risk. All the keywords are established in similar manner to bridge the differences between 
colloquial and professional language. Furthermore, if a specific concept, such as decision-
making or inclusion of relevant staff, is important for a given step of ISO31000:2009, 
derivatives of these are also included as keywords in the respective categories of the theory-
based content analysis. As these phrases can be used in the text in sections not relevant to 
the inquiry of the study, their relevance and conditions to be used in the findings are 
specified below. 
For the transparency of the study, it is important to highlight that the list of keywords was 
compiled in two phases. Prospective phase included establishing a part of the keywords prior 
to analysing the object of the research based on the key concepts of ISO31000:2009 and the 
most common assumed colloquial synonyms. Retrospective phase included a brief analysis of 
the court ruling and finding the terminology used in its language to complement the list of 
keywords established prospectively. The combined findings of these two phases resulted in 
the following keywords for each category: 
• Category 1: Court ruling from the perspective of establishing the risk management 
context 
The keywords will emphasize the action points relevant to the establishment of the risk 
management context. They include the following words and their derivatives:  
o Context, security situation, political situation, security environment – 
relevant if the court case discusses the context of the case when describing 
NRC’s failure to understand it properly. 
o information, knowledge, aware(ness), understand – relevant if the court 
mentions it in the context of the organization having had too little 
information of the context. 
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o Relevant people/personnel/staff, include, inclusion – relevant if the court 
mentions the lack of relevant staff members included in the safety/security 
related processes. 
o decision/decision making – relevant if the court addresses the lack of 
established lines of decision making in the case of security related issues 
• Category 2: Court ruling from the perspective of risk assessment 
Risk assessment framework looks at how the court ruling has implied that the steps of risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation had been lacking. It will look at lessons learned to 
enhance these steps to avoid the mistakes made by the NRC in their risk assessment 
processes. 
o Identify, identification, predict – Relevant in the context of the court 
discussing the NRC’s failure to identify or predict risks to an adequate level 
o Risk, Likelihood, probability, possibility – Relevant in the context of the 
court discussing the NRC’s failure to analyse the likelihood of a risk to an 
adequate level. 
o Impact, effect, outcome – Relevant in the context of the court discussing 
the NRC’s failure in predicting the impact of the risk to an adequate level. 
o Analysis, analyse, evaluate – Relevant in the context of the court discussing 
the NRC’s failure in analysing and evaluating their risks properly. 
• Category 3: Court ruling from the perspective of risk treatment 
Risk treatment is the most practical part of the inquiry, as it relies heavily on how the 
reasonable and justifiable treatment measures should have been implemented in the 
actions of NRC. This section makes references to the previous categories as needed, but 
attempts to arrive to over-arching findings in providing reasonable and justifiable risk 
treatment methods based on the general concept of high risk operational environments in 
the humanitarian context. 
o Treatment, control(s), measure(s) – Relevant in the context of evaluating 
how different controls and measures were applied in treating security-
related risks 
o Mitigate, mitigation – Relevant in the context of discussing how different 
mitigation measures were taken to reduce security related risks. 
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o Action(s) (taken), implement (controls) – Relevant in the context of actions 
taken or implemented to prevent risks. 
o Minimize, prevent, reduce – Relevant in the context of actions taken to 
minimize and reduce risk. 
These categories will be analysed from the perspective of the theoretical foundations and 
definitions laid down in the previous chapters. The study will look closely at the court 
findings and attempt to place them in the categories based on the steps of the risk 
assessment process. The analysis will rely on the theoretical framework of ISO31000:2009 
principles and guidelines from the perspective of security and safety risk management, but 
will be my and for the use supporting the learning of the industry that I work for. The validity 
of the researcher’s findings will be left on the reader to judge. The findings will attempt to 
broaden the concepts of each of these steps, but will not introduce any new definitions or 
core theories that have not been presented during the chapters on core definitions.  
8 Findings and analysis of the theory-based content analysis 
This chapter lays out the findings and the analysis around the theory-based content analysis. 
It is structured in a way that first presents the findings of the study objectively, and then 
provides a subchapter of analysis on how the mistakes can be avoided in the future for 
organizations operating in similar environments. 
Findings are denoted as the number of references found for each category and each keyword 
category. The number of references reflects the exact number of times the keyword 
appeared in the text. As the Oslo District Court ruling of the Dennis vs. NRC case reflects the 
reasoning and the thinking of the court that led to the ruling of gross negligence, it is 
assumed in the methodology of the study that the more time certain issues are referred to, 
the more they carried weight in the court’s decision. For example, if the court refers 
multiple times to the lack of certain security controls, these are listed as being references in 
the third category for risk treatment. 
Findings are laid out by first comparing the overall findings between the total number of 
references for each category. This is used to draw a big picture of the references and analyse 
which step of the risk management structure of ISO31000:2009 can be interpreted as having 
had most failures in, and thus had most weight in the ruling. After the overall findings, all the 
three categories are analysed individually and in depth. The attempt is to draw conclusions as 
to how risk management according to ISO31000:2009 can be used to avoid the faults made by 
the NRC at the time of the incident. 
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8.1 Overall findings: ISO31000:2009 
These overall findings attempt to draw case-specific conclusions on how the findings differed 
between categories, and if any assumptions can be made on how they differed. 
The overall findings are: 
• Category 1: Court ruling from the perspective of establishing the risk management 
context: Total 49 references 
• Category 2: Court ruling from the perspective of risk assessment: Total 117 
references 
• Category 3: Court ruling from the perspective of risk treatment: Total 104 
references 
From the big picture perspective, it can be analysed that a connection can be seen with all 
categories. Almost equal weight was given to categories 2 and 3, with the first category not 
far behind. It can be assumed, that in this case, the failures in risk treatment are directly 
linked to failures in the risk assessment phase. Furthermore, the failures in all categories can 
be traced to the inadequate establishment of the risk management context in the first step. 
This can be seen as the major overall finding of the study. It is, according to my analysis and 
the findings, very difficult to identify any individual step of the risk management process that 
was at the forefront when the ruling on gross negligence was made. Instead, failures during 
every step of the risk management process led to the combined effect of creating an 
environment where the incident could take place and happened without adequate risk 
mitigation measures in place. 
The court underlined on many occasions that the overall requirement for NRC to justifiably 
understand the risks in the location (category 2), and establish reasonable mitigation 
measures around those risks (category 3) were crucial in deciding on if they had acted in 
negligence. In the ruling, the findings were often presented together, and they underline the 
key finding of the analysis that there is a direct link between the failure to assess risk 
properly and the failure to treat them properly. 
“In making this assessment (of gross negligence), the Court has in particular attached 
importance to the existence of specific information that it was probable that a kidnapping 
could take place and that in the worst case, this could have a fatal outcome. Several 
practicable and effective alternative courses of action existed. Despite this, reasonable and 
necessary security measures were not implemented. Quite the contrary; the changes to the 
security plan made the risk of kidnapping increase substantially. Staff were not notified 
reasonably in advance of changes to the security measures, and as a consequence thereof 
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they were exposed to increased risk. Consequently, the decision-makers acted with gross 
negligence both when establishing the security measures and in that staff members were not 
informed of their role and the increased risk to which they were exposed. (Oslo District 
Court, 34)” 
This excerpt from the ruling can be interpreted that mistakes were made during every step of 
the risk management process. This also reflects the overall findings of the study where 
implicit references to most of the steps in the risk management process could be found in the 
ruling. Overall, it can be said that the gross negligence did not happen during any individual 
step from the perspective of the ISO31000:2009 risk management model. Instead, mistakes 
were made from the beginning, and the failures in each step fed into failures in the next. 
Thus, a more careful look at the different mistakes made during every step is crucial in 
informing well-rounded understanding of the failures that led to the incident and the ruling of 
gross negligence after the fact. 
According to my analysis, the following lessons learned can be drawn from these failures: 
• All the risk management steps feed into the success of the following steps. It is 
therefore crucial to not overlook the importance of, for example, the 
establishment of the risk management context in the light of wanting the risk 
management program to succeed. 
• All levels of the organization must be included in the risk management process to 
avoid gaps in information and decision-making. 
 
8.2 Category 1 finding: ISO31000:2009: Establishing the Risk Management Context 
The findings in the Category 1 were divided between the different keywords in the following 
manner: 
 
Context 8 
references 
Security/ political situation, security 
environment 
15 
references 
Information, knowledge, awareness, 
understand(ing) 
12 
references 
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Include, Inclusion, relevant 
people/personnel/staff 
5 
references 
Decision, decision-making 9 
references 
Context-related keywords were applied by the court when analysing NRC’s general 
preparedness in operating in the Dabaab Refugee Camp area. The difficulties of working in 
the area had been highlighted by multiple different internal and external studies. The court 
had taken these into account when analysing the level of context-specific preparedness of the 
NRC. The excerpts to follow from the court ruling highlight the primary trends of the failures 
in establishing the risk management context. They are iterated throughout the content 
analysis in different forms, but share the common thread of the major failures within the 
section of the process: 
“As a consequence of these (security) circumstances, the security situation in Dadaab 
deteriorated strongly. The UN raised the risk level in Dadaab from level 3 to level 4. In 
September 2011, a Kenyan driver from the organisation CARE was kidnapped, and in October 
2011 two foreign women from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) were kidnapped. (Oslo District 
Court, 3)” 
Furthermore, 
“The NRC's handling of staff security had been very weak for some time, both in terms of 
understanding the security context and in terms of implementing applicable minimum 
standards. (Oslo District Court, 8)” 
This example highlights the overall theme of the ruling, where the different sections of the 
risk management process can be seen feeding into each other. “understanding the security 
context” and “implementing applicable minimum standards” reflect all steps of the risk 
management process. The failures can be seen to stem from the lack of basic context 
awareness. One of the court’s most vocal rulings can be linked to the failure in context 
analysis: 
“Based on the evidence, the Court is of the opinion that there should have been a stronger 
security thinking and understanding in the Dadaab area. (Oslo District Court, 21)” 
Furthermore, 
“In the opinion of the Court, this indicates that the NRC's decision-makers should have acted 
differently, and they should at least have sought advice from competent security advisors 
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before making the decision. (Oslo District Court, 20)” – This refers to the decision of not 
using armed escort during the mission to the refugee camp. 
These sections highlight the fundamental failures in establishing the risk management 
context. As referred to earlier, context establishment relies on finding the right people to 
involve in the later steps of risk assessment and treatment. When choosing this team, it is the 
responsibility of the manager to ensure that enough people are involved as to provide the 
most context awareness possible. Well-informed process of risk identification requires the 
engagement of staff that provide the highest level of context awareness possible.  
Overall, it can be said that NRC failed to establish the right teams and risk management 
structures. Decisions were made without proper consultation. Furthermore, while most 
Security Advisers are not formal decisionmakers in their organizations, neglecting their advice 
can reinforce negligence in cases of critical incidents. This is highlighted in: 
 
“The decision-makers with regard to the security plan had, in the view of the Court, 
themselves the responsibility for securing a satisfactory basis for decision-making, including 
securing advice from advisors with security competence. (Oslo district Court, 30)” 
It can be said, based on the court’s findings and the ruling, that decisions made related to the 
risk management practices were made without clear input from the field staff and internal 
advisory elements that had most knowledge of the risks involved in that context. This failure 
to establish clear structures of informed decision-making led to the failure to predict risks 
and the overall ruling of gross negligence after the fact. 
According to my analysis, the following lessons learned can be drawn from these failures: 
• When establishing the risk management team, it is crucial to include 
staff/personnel with intimate knowledge of the local security context and the 
developments in the region in question. 
• These personnel must be included from the beginning and have a clearly defined 
role in all the steps of the risk management process. 
• Clear decision-making structures must be established from the beginning. If 
changes in controls or treatment are made, they must be made with clear 
procedures of consulting the relevant advisory elements.  
8.3 Category 2 findings: ISO31000:2009: Risk Assessment 
Failures in Risk assessment was given most attention in the court ruling. It is, according to 
ISO31000:2009, the longest section of the process as it comprises of risk identification, risk 
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analysis and risk evaluation. This might contribute to it including the most references in the 
findings. It can be said, however, that the failures of NRC were done on all levels of the risk 
assessment process, and contributed greatly to the incident and the ruling of gross negligence 
after the incident. 
 
Identify, identification, predict 3 references 
Risk, likelihood, probability, possibility, 
impact, effect, outcome 
115 references 
Analysis, Analyse, Evaluate 2 references 
 
The overall failures of NRC in the risk assessment happened through a repeatedly mentioned 
trend of failing to evaluate the risk of kidnapping adequately, and the failure to balance the 
likelihood of that risk with the risk of IEDs and other risks in the area. Overall, the findings of 
the court stress that the kidnap risk was externally accepted to be elevated. This referred to, 
not only certain internal advisories in NRC, but the findings of other NGOs and organizations 
operating in the region. The broad consensus was that armed escort should be used to 
minimize the risk of kidnap. 
“There had been several kidnapping incidents and the risk of kidnapping was as high. (Oslo 
District Court, 7)” 
Norwegian Refugee Council failed to emphasize the likelihood of kidnap risk in their own risk 
assessment, which led to the failure of choosing the proper mitigation measures later in the 
process. Furthermore, the following finding was made by the court to further emphasize the 
criticality of not overlooking the kidnap risk in the region: 
 
“Because of the security situation, no VIP visits were performed after the kidnappings in the 
autumn of 2011. According to the witness Daniel Hardy from the Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC), no other NGOs carried out any VIP visits at the time. He explained that they had 
performed VIP visits prior to the kidnappings of employees of CARE and Doctors Without 
Borders, but that all visits were halted after that. He explained that they experienced an 
escalation of the security situation and that the risk of kidnapping was considered to be 
increasing and unacceptable. (Oslo District Court, 14)” 
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Overlooking the broad trends in the risk analyses of other organizations, NRC had decided to 
carry on with the VIP visit. This reflects either negligence on part of the decision-makers, or 
the failure to realistically identify, analyse and evaluate kidnap related risks in the region. 
The NRC had, according to the court findings, attempted to balance the risk of kidnap with 
their own assessment of high risk of IEDs. This finding overlaps with the third category, but 
their rationale is relevant to the second category as well. 
“There was also a risk of being hit by an improvised bomb or road bomb, a so-called IED 
(improvised explosive device), but it is not a given that the risk of such attacks would 
increase noticeably in the case of an armed escort being used. (Oslo District Court, 8).” 
The failure to emphasize the right risks during the phase of risk evaluation led to the NRC 
making the critical mistake of overlooking the risk of kidnapping by prioritizing the risk of 
IEDs. This was a cumulative failure of context analysis, risk identification and risk analysis. 
Furthermore, it can be seen in the light of failure to make informed decisions about the 
security risks facing staff in the region. 
Furthermore, the court ruling empathized the lack of information security related risk 
assessment. They found that the inability to assess and treat information security related 
risks in relation to the kidnap risk was highly overlooked and contributed not only to the 
incident, but the overall ruling of gross negligence. 
“Furthermore, the NRC has itself acknowledged that there was a failure in the information 
security risk and that as a consequence the kidnappers may have come to know that a VIP 
visit was to take place on the day in question. This acknowledgment is supported by other 
evidence in the case. (Oslo District Court, 22)” 
The decision to undertake a VIP visit without an armed escort and the lack of information-
security related planning and risk assessment contributed to the incident and the ruling of 
gross negligence. It also places questions on the gravity of the failure to overemphasize the 
risk of IEDs in light of all the risk factors pointing to the elevated risk of kidnap (security 
environment and the information security). Even the highest levels of NRC security risk 
management did not have the clear picture of information security related findings of the risk 
assessment: 
 
“He (NRC HQ Security Advisor) explained that if he had known of the breaches of the 
information security, seen in conjunction with the amended security plan, he would have 
asked for the visit to be cancelled. (Oslo District Court, 20)” 
This poses difficult questions for NRC in terms of the scope of their risk assessment (did it not 
include information security?) and their decision-making structured as it relates to context 
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establishment (were the higher-level security personnel not aware of the risks related to 
information security breaches?). 
According to my analysis, the following lessons learned can be drawn from these failures: 
• The risk assessment process must be done with close cooperation of the field 
personnel who have the most inmate knowledge of the local security environment 
• Overall trends, the risk assessments and the incident experiences of other 
organizations operating in the area must be a crucial component during every step 
of the risk assessment. 
• Risk assessment must be able to look at broader risk dynamics around the threats 
and dangers in the area. Namely, the physical security risks must not be 
overemphasized in cases where, for example, information security risks feed 
directly into the likelihood of these events materializing. 
8.4 Category 3 findings: ISO31000:2009: Risk Treatment 
From the court’s perspective, the third category focused on the different security measures 
and controls, and how the failures in implementing them properly led to the incident. 
Security measures and controls can be understood as belonging to the category of risk 
treatment, as they are, according to risk management methodology, tools to reduce either 
the likelihood or the impact of the risk.  
The court worked on finding the causal relationship between different risk treatment 
methods, and how they lacked the ability to prevent the incident from happening. 
Furthermore, they analysed if alternative risk treatment methods could have been 
implemented to change the course of the events. 
 
Treatment, control(s), measure(s) 56 references 
Mitigate, mitigation 8 references 
Action(s), implement 22 references 
Prevent, reduce, minimize 18 references 
 
The findings in the third category are given almost equal weight to the second category. As 
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mentioned earlier, this highlights the fact that the failures in risk assessment directly feed 
into the failures in risk treatment. 
The overall failure in implementing proper security measures came, according to the court, in 
three major categories: information security, inclusion of security staff and physical security. 
According to the court, the combined effect of failures in all of these categories led to the 
incident taking place and the impact of the risk being amplified to the extent of the staff 
members getting kidnapped and injured. The combined effect of these failures is articulated 
by the court in the following manner: 
“The concrete errors relate to the failing information security, the fact that the visit was 
performed with a high profile, that a visit was made to IFO II, that the duration of the visit 
exceeded the recommended duration, as well as the lacking presence of security staff. Nor 
should the visit have been performed without the use of an armed escort. (Oslo District 
Court, 8)” 
The lack of armed escort was referred to as a reference of duty of care throughout the 
court’s ruling. This became especially relevant in the context where other organizations had 
used armed escort as a routine measure for an extended period of time due to alarming 
developments in the security context. From the perspective of security management, it is 
interesting to note that courts clearly used other organizations (whether they’d be similar 
peer-organizations or organizations of different nature) as a comparison as to what 
constitutes a standard operating practice in the area: 
 
“The reports show that the use of armed escort became a mandatory part of recommended 
security measures from the end of October 2011. (Oslo District Court,15)” 
And, 
 
“However, it had been an established practice for several months that because of the serious 
security situation, no other VIP visits had been carried out. Against this backdrop, it was to 
be expected that the organizers of the visit would contemplate the security situation with 
utmost seriousness, and at least implement necessary and reasonable security measures 
when it was decided that the visit was to be carried out. (Oslo District Court, 20)” 
 
With these observations, it can be concluded that the implementation of security controls 
relies not only on a purely internal assessment of the risks, but also a careful analysis on how 
other organizations operate in the area. If an incident takes place, considerable attention is 
being paid to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of all regional actors. If a deviation 
from a regional SOPs perspective is observed, as was in the case of Norwegian Refugee 
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Council, it can present as being the “tipping point” for the courts to rule that gross 
negligence took place. As the previous citation from the court ruling indicates, the SOP in the 
region was that VIP visits were not conducted, and the threshold to deploy armed escort was 
low. In case of NRC, a clear deviation from both current “regional norms” was observed. The 
courts placed significant attention on the fact that the NRC had failed to deploy armed escort 
even as they made a clear decision to take the risk of deploying a VIP staff member to the 
area. 
NRC justified the lack of armed escort as being a mitigation measure for minimizing the 
likelihood of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which were commonly used by militants in 
the area. Many witnesses to the court testified this being a justification fabricated after the 
fact, as the court concluded that any thorough risk management process would have 
identified that the risk of IEDs is not lowered by the lack of armed escort. In fact, this was 
testified as being on the contrary: 
 “A deterrent element shall generally be included in the security measures, and that in 
reality this indicates that an armed escort should have been used. He (Chris Allan, witness to 
the court) explained that ordinary movements inside the camps normally would take place 
without an escort, but that an escort should be used in the case of an international or high 
profile visit. Chris Allan also emphasized that the use of an armed escort did not increase 
the risk of IEDs. (Oslo District Court, 19)” 
The courts also identified that errors were made in terms of how the security controls were 
implemented, and how changes in the controls were handled in terms of the decision-making 
structures of the NRC. This relates equally to the first category of the theory-based content 
analysis, but has relevance on the implementation of controls as well. NRC had initially 
planned to use armed escort, but made the change on the last minute to use unarmed escort. 
The decision-making structure and the process that fed information from the field to the 
decision-makers was seen as lacking, and was evidenced to have been a root cause of not 
having the proper security controls in place: 
“The report (conducted on the incident by the NRC) contains a list of several weaknesses in 
the handling of security, and a list of several recommended measures to improve security. 
She explained in court that there were deviations in the understanding of the security 
situation and that those responsible had to understand that context analysis is a tool to 
make it possible to reach good decisions concerning security measures. (Oslo District Court, 
20)” 
This proves the earlier observation, that the failures in the early stages of the risk 
management process fed into the failures that led to inadequate application of controls in the 
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field level. These failures contributed into the disaster that led to the incident and the gross 
negligence in the NRC case observed in this study. 
NRC made the case that their security measures relied on the overall principle of low profile. 
This means that they believed that increasing security measures, going in armed and with a 
convoy would raise their profile enough as to increase the risk of drawing unwanted 
attention. This was rationalized as to feeding into the increased likelihood of attacks, 
assaults, IEDs or kidnap.  
The courts observed that the only tangible evidence of implementing low profile related to 
the removal of the armed escort as a security measure. The courts observed that this did not 
constitute as a reasonable level of low profile security implementation, as multiple failures 
were identified in managing information security practices: 
"Information security was inadequate, from the outset in late May many staff knew of the 
proposed visit and increasingly third parties were informed. The choice of date was 
inappropriate, it called people in on a day that was normally a non-working day and as such 
incentive staff members were given a week's notice of a VIP visit. (Oslo District Court, 22)" 
And, 
“No other measures were implemented for the visit to Dadaab to keep a low profile, apart 
from the removal of the armed escort. In connection with this, the Court mentions that the 
security advisors who gave evidence in the case stated that the removal of the escort was 
not an adequate measure for averting neither the risk of kidnapping nor IEDs. (Oslo District 
Court, 25)” 
These accounts of the court amplified the fact that in order to successfully implement low 
profile risk mitigation, the focus should be in how information is shared and how the 
knowledge of the event is controlled. The court found multiple situations where the 
inhabitants of the camp were informed of the upcoming visit. Furthermore, no provable 
vetting was made as to who was trusted with the information and who was not. This fed into 
the court’s conclusion that low-profile security management was not adequately 
implemented and would could not justifiably be used as an argument as to why the deviations 
of the region-wide SOPs were made. 
According to my analysis, the following lessons-learned can be drawn from these failures: 
• The failure to implement proper security controls and risk treatment methods is 
directly linked to the strength of the context analysis, peer-organization analysis 
and the involvement of all levels of organizational decision-makers and advisors 
within the organization. 
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• The decision to change risk treatment methods must be done with all available 
resources (human and other). If, for any reasons, these resources cannot be 
utilized at the time, the change should not be implemented to preserve 
accountability. 
• Courts place considerable weight on how other organizations operate in the 
region. To avoid exposure to negligence, all controls and SOPs should be up to 
comparative standards. If deviations are made, they should be made with absolute 
discretion and with proper due diligence. 
• Low profile approach is not criticised as such in the case of NRC. If implemented, 
it requires a careful examination of what constitutes a low-profile approach. This 
relates to proper implementation of information security measures that minimize 
the risk of critical mission information leaking into wrong hands. 
 
9 Chart for lessons learned and for organizations to improve ISO31000:2006 -based security 
risk management practices in high-risk contexts 
The following boxes highlight the overarching lessons learned for organizations that want to 
enhance their risk management practices in light of the gross negligence ruling for the 
Norwegian refugee council. All lessons learned are placed in the distinct categories in relation 
to the ISO31000:2009 process: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTABLISHING THE 
CONTEXT 
 
• Include personnel 
from all levels of 
the organization 
and from the field 
in the risk 
management team 
• Establish clear lines 
of communication 
between team 
members 
• Identify decision-
makers and train 
them in their role 
• Brief and raise 
awareness of the 
risk management 
process across all 
staff working within 
the context of the 
process 
 
 
 
 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
 
• Include the staff working in the field in 
the risk identification process 
• Always use peer-organization analysis as a 
tool for risk identification 
• Always conduct thorough context analysis 
• Use external intelligence as much as 
possible, do not rely on in-house 
intelligence alone 
• Include all levels of organization in risk 
identification. This creates ownership and 
also feeds into process-related risk 
awareness 
• Be cautious as to not over emphasize 
certain categories of risks over others. 
Include experts of information security, 
communications and others as well as the 
more traditional physical security experts. 
• Have a legal professional support risk 
identification from the perspective of 
external compliance risk and exposure 
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RISK ANALYSIS 
 
• When analysing risks, do 
not overlook how failures 
in processes and 
communications can lead 
to further risks and other 
undesired outcomes 
• Include the core risk 
management team in risk 
analysis 
• Use peer-organization 
support and lessons 
learned in defining and 
brainstorming possible 
outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
RISK TREATMENT 
 
• Do not overlook regional 
SOPs and best practices 
and operational “norms”.  
• Do not overlook risk 
treatment methods that 
relate to informing, 
training and sharing of 
responsibilities 
• Understand your overall 
strategy for security 
management (e.g low 
profile) and identify the 
key treatment methods 
that promote that very 
strategy.  
• Do not hesitate to revisit 
the previous stages of the 
process if new 
information or new risks 
arise during the planning 
process of risk treatment. 
• Establish clear plans on 
how/when/why to 
deviate from the original 
risk treatment plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
RISK EVALUATION 
 
• Evaluate the relevant 
risks not only from the 
perspective of physical 
security -related 
incidents, but also from 
the perspective of how 
process-failures can lead 
to unforeseen 
consequences. Do not 
overlook risks that are 
directly not related to 
critical incidents.  
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10 Conclusions and further research  
To conclude, it is useful to refer to the original research questions and analyse if the findings 
answered all the questions posed.  
10.1 Conclusions for the first research question 
The first research question was: “In the findings of the court ruling, and analyzed based on 
the definitions of ISO31000:2009 process of risk management, how was the security risk 
management of NRC lacking at the time of the incident?” 
The study referred to the court ruling as the single document that summarized the findings 
and the rationale of the court. It was examined through a theory-based content analysis that 
relied on the established terminology of the ISO31000:2009 risk management standard. While 
the court did not mention risk management explicitly, it has many implicit references to 
similar processes and steps within the established risk management framework. Theory-based 
content analysis was found, according to my opinion, a useful tool of extracting this implicit 
information from the court text. 
One of the main findings of the research was that, in the Dennis vs. NRC court case, implicit 
references to risk management failures were found throughout the entire process. Keyword-
findings were spread surprisingly evenly distributed across all the different steps of the 
ISO31000:2009 process. The assessment was made that the case demonstrates that equal 
importance must be given to every step of the risk management process. Failures in the 
earlier steps of the risk management process had fed into failures later. This created an 
environment where inadequate safeguards were in place, and the incident could happen and 
cause serious harm to staff members in question. 
Establishing the risk management context must be done in collaboration with the field team 
and the headquarters. Norwegian Refugee Council had failed to engage all relevant staff 
members in the organization. This resulted in the failure to establish the level of context 
awareness and knowledge required in the risk management team to tackle the complex 
operational environment. Furthermore, clear lines of communication and decision-making 
were not established from the beginning. In ISO31000:2009 -based risk management, these 
are a fundamental part of establishing the risk management and risk response team during 
the phase of establishing the context for the risk management target. 
Lacking expertise in the risk management team led to inadequate risk assessment. Risks were 
either ignored, as was the case with information security related risks, or, as was the case 
with IED risk, analyzed improperly. The risk of IEDs was seen as higher than the risk of kidnap, 
which led to the failure to prioritize security controls that could have either prevented or 
reduced the impact of the incident. 
 44 
 
NRC had chosen to take a low-profile approach with security management. This led to risk 
treatment methods that were inadequate. The catastrophic failure to implement proper risk 
treatment methods was a direct result of inadequate risk analysis. NRC had evaluated the risk 
of IEDs to be higher than the risk of kidnap, and decided to not use armed escort. This would, 
according to NRC’s analysis, lead to a lower profile presence and reduce the risk of militant 
attacks with IEDs. According to the court’s findings, the decision to not use armed escort did 
not only contribute to the impact of the kidnap, but did not reduce the risk of IEDs. 
Furthermore, no information security precautions were made to keep the mission secret. Risk 
treatment methods must be directly and clearly in line with the risk assessment. The low-
profile approach for security management was made with inadequate backing from the 
findings of the risk assessment. 
Multiple references were found in the court ruling to the effect of implicitly referring to 
failures in the NRC risk management practices. Overall, it can be concluded that NRC failed 
during every step of their risk management process to produce meaningful security. The 
failure started from the first steps of establishing the context, and resulted in the failure to 
implement effective security controls.  
The study was conducted by using the ISO31000:2009 related synonyms and colloquial 
definitions in attempting to find implicit references to risk management practices in the court 
ruling. The validity of the study relies on the validity of how the different categories and 
keywords were established. This provides opportunities for future researchers to set the 
framework of the study in a different way to find more intricacies in the content and its 
implicit refences and meanings. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to explore more in-depth 
how a single distinct step in the risk management process influenced the court’s decision. 
This can refer to, for example, a more detailed look on risk management process support 
functions such as communications. This was mentioned on numerous occasions in m study, but 
did not receive a full study of its own. This was a rational decision on my part to limit the 
scope of the study on the three main steps of the risk management model. 
Furthermore, future studies on the topic might also benefit from bringing more specific 
information on the topic into light. The study conducted here can be criticized for pointing 
out something that can be seen as self-evident. As pointing out something that my security 
professionals take for granted: that all steps of the risk management process matter equally. 
This was reflected in the findings where it was not able to point out any single step of the risk 
management process in particular that the NRC had failed in. While, in my opinion, it is 
valuable to find confirmation to this broad effect as well, the industry can benefit 
tremendously from a more targeted study that has a narrower scope and more narrow 
perspective. This would allow a more detailed consider how one distinct element of security 
management in particular can have tremendous impact on the entire process.   
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10.2 Conclusions for the second research question and the industry application 
The second research question was: “How can the findings assist organizations in developing 
better practices for security risk management in high-risk contexts?” 
All the findings from the first section of the study were summarized in a single sheet of 
lessons-learned and best practices drawn. These findings can assist organizations in 
developing their own practices for operating in high-risk environments. This is especially 
beneficial, in my opinion, for humanitarian organizations that routinely work in challenging 
contexts and often rely on low profile approaches in their security management and risk 
treatment methodologies.  
They key findings for establishing the risk management context include the participation of 
correct staff and the engagement of correct human resources for the risk management team. 
The leading manager must understand, on a broad level, the basic demands of the field and 
be sure to include all relevant personnel in the process of risk management from the 
beginning. Clear lines of decision-making and communication need to be established from the 
beginning. It is crucial to understand that failures in establishing the risk management 
context will feed into inadequate risk management outputs later in the process. 
Risk assessment must be done with utilizing thorough analysis of how all organizations 
operate in the region. The importance of external intelligence is crucial. Internal and 
external stakeholders on all levels of the organization must be involved, and departments 
dealing with information management and HR, for example, must not be overlooked. Careful 
work must be done to evaluate the risks in order to understand how emphasizing certain 
individual risks and approaches to risk mitigation will create requirements to adequately 
understand the residual risks of the decisions. In the case of the NRC, the decision to 
implement a low-profile approach was not complemented with adequate information security 
precautions. A holistic approach to risk assessment is crucial for the success of the risk 
management program and the risk treatment in general. 
Effective risk treatment is determined by a grounded reliance on the practices and findings 
established in the previous steps of the risk management process. In order to avoid negligence 
in cases of incidents, it is important to not overlook how organizations in general operate in 
the area. SOPs should be thought in terms of regional and local operational norms. If a 
deviation from the common SOPs is made, it must be justified on the grounds of a thoroughly 
conducted risk assessment. 
In my opinion, the lessons-learned are useful and thorough. They provide a sound base for 
organizations to make decisions over how security should be handled in the contexts where 
they work. The process of extracting lessons learned from the theory-based content analysis 
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was seamless, and in my opinion, the research method deployed was extremely useful for this 
kind of research that aims to draw practical conclusions from a case or a selection of research 
material. 
The industry application of the findings will provide a thorough breakdown of how the lessons 
learned can be taken into consideration during every step of the ISO31000:2009 risk 
management process. These findings are beneficial in providing a thorough picture of how 
organizations should enhance their risk management practices to reduce the occurrence of 
similar incidents in the future. When combined with the previous studies on the topic, a 
broad overview of lessons learned is beginning to be established for the industry. 
The overall findings must be understood in being a result of a very particular study on a very 
particular event of interest. It is, therefore, necessary for all organizations to use their own 
discretion and context awareness in making security and safety related decisions. The 
findings can be criticized as to being too particular given the context and the target of the 
study. However, a rational decision was made to attempt to broaden the scope of the findings 
to fit as naturally as possible to the context of diverse environment of organizations working 
in many different countries. 
It is possible, as future research, to compile a similar table of findings to reflect only the NRC 
case the lessons learned for that organization. While the findings would be more specific and 
limited in terms of universal applicability, they would benefit from the possibility of a more 
in-depth look of how similar situations could be handled better. Furthermore, these more 
detailed findings could be translated to a broader base to provide even a better sense of how 
one organizations operate, and indeed, as the court ruling proved, for other organizations to 
understand how to do better peer-organization benchmarking and harmonization of controls 
and SOPs. The lack of NRC’s ability to do this well enough was one of the contributing factors 
in their gross negligence. This, of course, applies to organizations other that NRC as well. As a 
point of reflection and analysis, every organization can benefit from a direct and limited look 
into how a particular organization failed or succeeded in risk management. 
Overall, the findings and answers to both research questions serve the aim of providing more 
information to organizations that are serious about minimizing incidents and providing 
adequate levels of duty care to their staff members. Humanitarian organizations are no 
different from other organizations in their need to protect their staff and create a safe and 
secure working environment.  
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